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REASSESSING THE APPLICABILITY OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
SHAPING OF EDUCATIONAL POLICY
AFTER KADRMAS v. DICKINSON
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Stuart Biegel t
"Success" in America has been exemplified by "The Horatio
Alger Dream," an optimistic vision of a land where limitless oppor-
tunities and great personal happiness await those who diligently em-
brace the traditional work ethic.1 Despite the ongoing skepticism of
leading commentators, 2 and the often-bitter satirical writings of ma-
jor literary figures, 3 Americans in the late twentieth century refuse
to abandon this vision. Many still seek to identify policies that would
enable all citizens to "pursue happiness" by developing their talents
and fulfilling their hopes for a brighter future.4
The fourteenth amendment has become the single most impor-
tant vehicle for the protection of individual rights in this area.5 Dis-
advantaged plaintiffs attempting to pursue happiness under
t Lecturer in Education Law, UCLA School of Law. Special Counsel, California
State Department of Education. Lecturer in Law Policy, and Directed Field Experience,
UCLA Graduate School of Education. The author would like to dedicate this Article to
the memory of his beloved mother, Helen Biegel... remembering her concern for the
community, and the unique combination of kindness and strength that she personified.
1 Horatio Alger's highly popular nineteenth-century novels all embody a similar
story line. See generally J. TEBBE, FROM RAGS TO RICHES: HORATIO ALGER, JR. AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM (1963) (describing the impact of such works as Risen from the Ranks,
Strive and Succeed, and Struggling Upward).
2 See, e.g., N. GLAZER, THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL POLICY (1988); WJ. WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
See generally B. BRUDNO, POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND THE LAW (1976) (analyzing the effects
of poverty as a barrier to access to the educational and political processes).
3 See, e.g., T. DREISER, AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1925); W.D. HOWELLS, THE RISE OF
SILAS LAPHAM (1885); F. KAFKA, AMERIKA (1946); N. WEST, A COOL MILLION (1934) (four
novels which go to great lengths to characterize this alleged dream as "The Horatio
Alger Myth").
4 See, e.g., D. ELWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1988)
(outlining a program for combatting poverty that extends far beyond current federal
legislation); C. MURRAY, IN PURSUIT: OF HAPPINESS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT (1988) (an-
alyzing the potentials for success if people are left unimpeded to "make small, incremen-
tal changes in their lives").
5 See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (3d ed.
1986).
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conditions of enduring social inequity have often looked to the
Equal Protection Clause,6 occasionally relying on the "fundamental
rights" doctrine and its unique combination of due process and
equal protection guarantees.7
In Brown v. Board of Education,8 the United States Supreme
Court began to clarify the central role that the fourteenth amend-
ment would play in enabling all citizens to derive maximum benefit
from the public educational system.9 Building on the recognition in
Brown that public schooling was "perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments,"' 0 several commentators soon
began to argue that education would be a logical addition to the
growing list of fourteenth amendment "fundamental rights."' 1
State action impinging on a student's education would thus be sub-
ject to the strictest possible standard of review.' 2 Yet a 5-4 majority
6 See, e.g., D. TYACK, T. JAMES & A. BENAVOT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION 4 (1987) (documenting the emergence of law as "a major tool in the quest
for social justice in education").
7 See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 970
(1987) (placing the "fundamental interest" line of cases "at the intersection of equal
protection and substantive due process").
"Fundamental rights," though not expressly granted by the Constitution, have been
held to be implicitly guaranteed to individuals under a variety of controversial legal the-
ories. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1063, 1067-89 (1981) (outlining the major posi-
tions in the ongoing debate regarding the sources and limits of fundamental rights anal-
ysis).
The modern "fundamental rights" doctrine can be traced back to the 1942 case of
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in which the Supreme Court invalidated
Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act. "We are dealing here,"Justice Douglas
wrote, "with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541.
Since that time, the list of rights recognized as "fundamental" under the fourteenth
amendment grew to include at least (1) the right to privacy (Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965)); (2) the right to vote (Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)); (3) the right to interstate travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969)); and (4) the right of access to the judicial process (see, e.g., Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)).
8 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9 See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
10 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
11 See, e.g., Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitu-
tional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 372-98 (1969).
12 During the school finance revolution of the 1970s, several state courts adopted
the position that education was a fundamental right. Strict scrutiny was therefore ap-
plied, and statewide systems of school finance were found to violate federal and/or state
equal protection clauses. In many of these cases, victorious plaintiffs bolstered their
positions by also arguing that wealth should be considered a suspect classification. See,
e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); see also Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96
Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
For an excellent overview of the school finance reform movement in general, see D.
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in the 1973 case of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 13
explicitly determined that education was not a fundamental right
under the United States Constitution and did not merit the strict
scrutiny that accompanied such a designation.' 4 Analyzing the im-
pact of the Rodriguez decision, many concluded that fundamental
rights analysis was simply not viable in a school setting. 15
Legal doctrines, however, often develop several parallel
strands. One strand may "run its course," while others retain a con-
tinuing vitality. 16 During the past two decades, several key educa-
tion rights cases suggest the possibility of a "fundamental rights"
approach under an intermediate level of judicial review.17
In the most recent Supreme Court case to address the topic of
public education, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools,18 the plaintiff
sought to have the Court apply such a heightened scrutiny frame-
work on behalf of Sarita Kadrmas, an economically disadvantaged
North Dakota child living sixteen miles from the nearest elementary
school. 19 The majority ultimately held for the defendant, rejecting
the family's contention that the imposition of a fee for the school
district's optional door-to-door bus service violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.20
Yet despite Justice O'Connor's suggestion that this case in-
volved no more than a relatively straightforward application of Rod-
riguez,2' Kadrmas proved to be a closely contested 5-4 decision
accompanied by two strong dissents. 22 Given the highly volatile na-
KIRP, M. YUDOF, T. VAN GEEL & B. LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL POuCY AND THE LAW, 637-97 (2d
ed. 1987).
13 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
14 Id. at 28-39. See generally infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., Liebman, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: Local Discre-
tion and Common Sense Affirmed, 2 J.L. & EDuc. 463, 464 (1973); Comment, The Right to
Education: A Constitutional Analysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 796, 809-10 (1975) (authored by
Patricia Wright Morrison); Comment, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez" A
Retreat from Equal Protection, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 585, 596 (1973) (authored by Carl F.
Noll).
See generally Kirp, Law, Politics, and Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits ofJudicial
Involvement, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 117 (1977) (analyzing the manner in which major edu-
cational questions have been analyzed in wake of less activist 1970s courts).
16 The "political question" doctrine and the "clear and present danger" doctrine
are two particularly noteworthy examples in this regard. See, e.g., Henkin, Is There a
"Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and
Present Danger'" FroW Schenk to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
17 See infra notes 78-156 and accompanying text.
18 108 S.Ct. 2481 (1988).
19 See id. at 2484-88.
20 See id. at 2489-91.
21 According to Justice O'Connor, the Court was simply acknowledging once again
that, under the United States Constitution, wealth was not a suspect classification and
education not a fundamental right. See id. at 2487.
22 See id. at 2491-95. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
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ture of the case's subject matter, this difference of opinion is not
surprising. Few areas of constitutional law have proven more con-
troversial than the three that the Kadrmas Court attempted to ad-
dress: the right to equal educational opportunity, the emergence of
a new heightened scrutiny, and the role of the judiciary in shaping
public policy.23
This Article examines the applicability of fundamental rights
analysis in light of the Kadrmas decision. Part I analyzes the parame-
ters of the right to equal educational opportunity and the trend to-
ward a minimal standard of adequate educational services.2 4 Part II
documents the emergence of intermediate judicial review, focusing
on the precedential value of key education cases. 25 Part III explores
prospective litigation under the heightened scrutiny framework, and
suggests the potential for shaping educational policy in the related
areas of testing and curriculum. 2 6 The Article concludes that this
new fundamental rights framework remains a particularly promising
approach for maximizing equality of educational opportunity under
the fourteenth amendment.
I
THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF THE RIGHT TO EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
In Brown v. Board of Education,27 the Court held that under the
Equal Protection Clause "the opportunity of an education . ... is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms." 28 Most
commentators and jurists have determined that this language vali-
dates a "right" to some form of "equal educational opportunity," 29
with the subsequent debates centering on the definition of the term
and on the extent to which a legal system can require or enforce
equality of opportunity.30
Brennan joined; Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Blackmun
joined.
23 See Biegel, Major Issues Left Unresolved: After Kadrmas, U.S. Supreme Court Is in "a
Holding Pattern," L.A. Daily Journal, July 22, 1988, § 1, at 4, col. 2 (where a variety of
perspectives underlying this Article were initially explored).
24 See infra notes 27-76 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 78-156 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 157-257 and accompanying text.
27 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28 Id at 493.
29 See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 511 (D.D.C. 1967) (the "sum re-
sult. .. when tested by the principles of equal protection and due process, is to deprive
the poor and a majority of the Negro students ... of their constitutional right to equal
educational opportunities."), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
30 See, e.g., Coleman, The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity, 38 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 7 (1968); Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurispru-
dence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 583 (1968); Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the
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More than three decades later, Justice Marshall relied heavily
on the language of Brown in his Kadrmas dissent, reproducing the
most famous paragraph from Chief Justice Warren's opinion3 l and
concluding that the North Dakota statute authorizing the imposition
of fees for transporting students infringes upon the right to equal
opportunity.3 2 "In allowing a State to burden the access of poor
persons to an education," he declared, "the Court denies equal op-
portunity and discourages hope. I do not believe the Equal Protec-
tion Clause countenances such a result."33
A. The Parameters of the Right
Marshall's focus on the right to equal educational opportunity
as the key interest at stake in the North Dakota case reflects the con-
tinuing vitality of this right in the American legal system today. In-
deed, the controversy regarding the parameters of the right has
been at the center of many school-related disputes. Although not
always mentioned explicitly, "denial of equal opportunity" is typi-
cally a central, underlying concern in fourteenth amendment litiga-
tion that involves such volatile areas as school desegregation,3 4
school finance,3 5 handicapped rights3 6 (including the rights of
AIDS-infected students),3 7 standardized testing,38 and bilingual
education.3 9
The right to equal educational opportunity has appeared in
Courts, 51 TEx. L. REV. 411 (1973). See generally E. STEVENS & G. WOOD, JUSTICE, IDEOL-
OGY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION Chs.
1-2 (1987) (tracing the evolutionary shifts in interpretation of the concept of equality of
educational opportunity).
31 See 108 S. Ct. at 2493 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493):
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expendi-
tures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance
of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance
of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.
It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal in-
strument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.
32 Id. at 2493-94.
33 Id. at 2494.
34 See, e.g., Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
35 See generally supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
36 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
37 See Note, Protecting Children with AIDS Against Arbitrary Exclusion from School, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1373 (1986) (authored by Leah Hammett).
38 See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984); Debra P. v. Turlington,
730 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1984).
39 See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status
Conflict, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 321 (1987).
1082 [Vol. 74:1078
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many different guises, typically in the form of judicially recognized
rights or state statutory entitlements. Major cases have pinpointed a
right to acquire knowledge, 40 a right to a free and suitable "publicly
supported education," 4' a right of "advancement on the basis of in-
dividual merit,"42 and a right to "direct the education of children by
selecting reputable teachers and places." 43 State and federal enti-
tlements provide public school students and their parents with addi-
tional, specific protection against the denial of opportunity,44 such
as the right to procedural safeguards when a student is suspended
or expelled,45 the right to a free and appropriate public education
for the handicapped, 46 and the right to a safe school environment. 47
Typical statutory guidelines also give citizens the right to an educa-
tion that "meets the needs" of all pupils, 48 within the framework of
specific subject matter that the state deems essential.49 Many provi-
sions spell out clear educational goals, specifying particular skills
that parents have a right to expect their children to attain in a public
40 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
41 Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972).
42 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982).
43 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). Courts have identified
additional rights in a school setting within the framework of other amendments. See, e.g.,
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 570 (1988) (right to an education consistent
with "the shared values of a civilized social order") (quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 878-79
(1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (right of access to ideas). See also infra
note 241.
44 Education is not explicitly mentioned in the United States Constitution, and thus
it became, from the earliest days of the republic, a "power" reserved to the states under
the tenth amendment. See E. REUTrER, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 2 (3d ed. 1985).
It should be noted, however, that during recent decades the number of federal statutes
dealing with education has increased significantly. See generally Levin, The Courts, Congress,
and Educational Adequacy: The Equal Protection Predicament, 39 MD. L. REv. 187, 226-45
(1979).
45 See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 22, § 10-22.6 (Smith-Hurd 1989 Supp.); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 3313.66 (Baldwin 1988); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-310 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
46 See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982) (The Education of the Handicapped
Act). See also infra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
47 See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. I, § 28(c). See generally Biegel, The "Safe Schools" Provision:
Can a Nebulous Constitutional Right Be a Vehicle for Change?, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 789
(1987) (arguing against the proposition that the "safe schools" provision added to the
California constitution in 1982 imposes upon school districts an increased duty of care).
48 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 229.555 (1)(b) (West Supp. 1988) (requiring a curricu-
lum "meeting the educational needs of students and the public"); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24,
§ 1512 (Purdon Supp. 1988) (mandating a course of study "adapted to ... the needs of
the pupils"). See also 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (1982) (meeting the "special" education
needs of children, especially those who have been deprived); 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3262
(1982) (bilingual education programs).
49 See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 71, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1978 & 1988 Supp.); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 380.1166-380.1171 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988). See also 20 U.S.C.
§ 951(8) (1982) (declaring that students "should receive in school, background and
preparation in the arts and humanities"); 20 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2565 (1982) (mandating
career education).
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school system.50
The right to equal educational opportunity has become a
strong and multi-faceted interest, evolving from the fourteenth
amendment and buttressed by an extensive statutory scheme and
well-settled judicial precedent. When federal legislation establishing
a separate Department of Education included a declaration that the
new cabinet post had been set up "to strengthen the federal com-
mitment to ensuring access to equal opportunity for every individ-
ual,"5' Congress was simply affirming that this recognized right now
occupied a position of central importance in educational policy
making.
B. A "Basic Floor of Opportunity": Clarifying the Legal
Impact of the Right
The Burger Court, particularly in the school finance case of San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez52 and the handicapped
student case of Board of Education v. Rowley, 53 attempted to clarify the
legal impact of the right to equal educational opportunity by moving
toward a minimal standard of educational adequacy.5 4
In Rodriguez, Justice Powell, writing for the Court, suggested al-
most as an aside that some minimal level of adequate educational
services might be required under the fourteenth amendment. 55
Nine years later, this dicta apparently became the foundation ofJus-
tice Rehnquist's analysis in Board of Education v. Rowley. The Rowley
50 See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code § 51,004 (West 1989):
[I]t is the policy of the people of the State of California to provide an
educational opportunity to the end that every student leaving school shall
have the opportunity to be prepared to enter the world of work: that
every student who graduates from any state-supported educational insti-
tution should have sufficient marketable skills for legitimate remunerative
employment....
See also NJ. Const. art. IV, § 7 (guaranteeing a "thorough and efficient" system of
education); see generally Robinson v. Cahill, 70 NJ. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976) (Robinson
VII), the most recent of numerous decisions attempting to construe the scope of this
guarantee in a protracted school finance dispute. For additional explorations of a legal
right to education in this context, see Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to
Education under State Constitutional Law, 18J.L. & EDuC. 93 (1989) (assessing the potential
impact of relying on the "education articles" in state constitutions); Levin, Education as a
Constitutional Entitlement: A Proposed Judicial Standard for Determining How Much Is Enough,
1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 703 (arguing that "the state must ensure a basic level of education
for all").
51 20 U.S.C. § 3402(1) (1982).
52 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
53 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
54 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
55 See id. ("Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is
a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [these rights], we
have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures ... provide an
education that falls short."). See generally Levin, supra note 44.
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Court considered whether the refusal to provide an in-class sign-
language interpreter for a deaf student "constituted a denial of the
'free appropriate public education' guaranteed by the [Education of
the Handicapped] Act."56 Acknowledging that the act was promul-
gated "to provide equal protection of the laws," 57 and that a "right
to equal educational opportunity" had been recognized by previous
fourteenth amendment decisions, the Court explored the possibility
of establishing a workable standard for this interest.58
Given the differences in "educational opportunities provided
by our public school[s]," and the "myriad of factors that might affect
a particular student's ability to [succeed]," the Court declared that
"[t]he requirement that States provide 'equal' educational opportu-
nities would .. .seem to present an entirely unworkable standard
requiring impossible measurements and comparisons." 59  The
Court concluded, therefore, that a "basic floor of opportunity"
would be enough to satisfy the mandate of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Under this minimal standard, the Court would focus only on
whether allegedly injured students were being provided with
"[equal] access ... sufficient to confer some educational benefit
"60
Justice O'Connor appeared to follow this line of reasoning in
Kadrmas,61 choosing to focus on the plaintiff's contention that the
"user fee for bus service unconstitutionally deprives those who can-
not afford.., it of 'minimum access to education.' "62 Although she
did not explicitly refer to a "right to equal educational opportu-
nity," her analysis of what might constitute "minimum access" '63
suggests that for the majority, denial of minimum access (or "basic
floor of opportunity") might constitute an infringement of the right.
She concluded, however, that in light of Rodriguez, Sarita Kadrmas's
56 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.
57 I at 198; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982) (generally known as the Educa-
tion of the Handicapped Act). Section 1400(b)(9) provides, in pertinent part: "It is in
the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to pro-
vide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure
equal protection of the law."
58 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198-201.
59 Id. at 198.
60 Id at 200-01.
61 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988).
62 Id. at 2487.
63 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated: "Appellants contend that...
[the] user fee... unconstitutionally deprives those who cannot afford to pay it of 'mini-
mum access to education.'... Appellants must therefore mean to argue that the busing
fee unconstitutionally places a greater obstacle to education in the path of the poor than
it does in the path of wealthier families. Alternatively, appellants may mean to suggest
that the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively requires government to provide free
transportation to school, at least for some class of students that would include Sarita
Kadrmas." Id
1085
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interest was not sufficient to trigger heightened judicial review. Jus-
tice O'Connor thus applied the deferential rational basis test and
found that "charging a user fee for bus service is constitutionally
permissible." 64
In declining to apply a more exacting level of scrutiny, the
Court overlooked a viable, principled approach that could have
given effect to the plaintiff's right of equal opportunity under cur-
rent judicial precedent.
C. The Plyler Framework: Fundamental Rights Analysis and
the Denial of Equal Educational Opportunity
In Plyler v. Doe,65 the right to equal educational opportunity
triggered a heightened level of judicial review. Plaintiffs had
mounted an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a Texas statute
that prevented undocumented alien children from enrolling in pub-
lic schools. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, conceded at
the outset that education was not a fundamental right granted by
the United States Constitution.66 Nonetheless, his reasoning fol-
lowed the usual pattern of fundamental rights analysis: 67 a key in-
terest was identified, which in turn required the Court to apply a
higher level of scrutiny.
After alluding to the occasionally suspect nature of an alienage
classification and identifying a parallel between the students in Plyler
and the illegitimate children of previous cases, 68 the Court focused
on the importance of the interest in education and the related right
to equal opportunity. Justice Brennan first cited a wide variety of
school-related cases in support of his assertion that education was
not "merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from
other forms of social welfare legislation," but an important interest
that plays a "fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our soci-
ety. '"69 He then turned to the consequences of denying students an
education and simultaneously introduced the "right to equal educa-
tional opportunity" into the analysis, 70 ultimately reproducing the
same passage from Brown that Justice Marshall comes back to in his
64 Id. at 2489-91.
65 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
66 Id. at 221.
67 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (access to courts); Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote); see also San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (describing the typical pattern of
fundamental rights analysis).
68 See Ply/er, 457 U.S. at 218-20.
69 Id. at 221.
70 Id. at 221-23.
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1989] FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AFTER KADRMAS
Kadrmas dissent six years later.7 ' "These well-settled principles,"
Brennan concluded, "allow [the Court] to determine the proper
level of deference to be afforded [the Texas statute]. '"72
The Plyler framework thus begins by identifying a key interest in
education along with an implicated class, continues by recognizing a
specific right to equal educational opportunity, and concludes by
determining that such dire consequences would result from a denial
of the right that this deprivation should trigger heightened scru-
tiny.73 Unlike typical "fundamental rights" cases, where the interest
is found to be fundamental and the level of scrutiny is therefore
deemed to be "strict," the interest in Plyler is described as "impor-
tant" and tied to a process that plays a "fundamental" role.74 This
important interest, bolstered by a recognized right to equal oppor-
tunity and the identification of a disabling status, thus triggers a cor-
responding level of scrutiny that falls somewhere between the
rational relationship standard and the strict judicial review afforded
to state action that impinges upon fundamental rights.75
In his dissent, ChiefJustice Burger criticized the majority opin-
ion as a "unique confluence of theories and rationales" that would
come to "stand for little beyond the results in [the case itself]." '76
Yet Plyler was not the first case to apply heightened scrutiny under
the fourteenth amendment. The development of an intermediate
level of review over the past two decades has been thoroughly
documented. 77
II
THE EVOLUTION OF AN INTERMEDIATE STANDARD
OF REVIEW
It is generally agreed that, within the context of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court will now apply more than a minimal rational-
ity standard but less than strict scrutiny in a number of clearly iden-
71 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
72 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
73 iL at 218-24.
74 1& at 221.
75 The rational relationship standard requires only that the state action "be shown
to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes." San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973). The strict scrutiny standard requires
that the state action "further a compelling state interest." Id. at 16. The standard in
Plyler, requiring that the state action further some substantial goal, appears to fall some-
where in between the two. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224 (stating that the disputed legisla-
tion "can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the
State").
76 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 243.
77 See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
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tifiable situations. 78
The evolution of this "heightened" scrutiny has been one of the
most controversial developments in modem constitutional law.
Since a majority ofjustices have failed to provide "a coherent expla-
nation of the characteristics which . . . trigger intermediate re-
view," 79  several members of the Court, as well as many
commentators, have attempted to establish a unifying framework for
the seemingly disparate fourteenth amendment decisions in this
area.80 Some have identified a so-called "sliding scale" theory of
judicial scrutiny,81 while others have argued that a case-by-case in-
78 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (gender
discrimination); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (illegitimacy).
The intermediate level of review emerged most clearly and emphatically in an Equal
Protection Clause context, because equality has become "the argument of first choice"
when fourteenth amendment violations are alleged. See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equal-
ity, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 538 (1982). See generally Brest, supra note 7 (discussing funda-
mental rights adjudication).
79 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrrIoNAL LAw 1614 (2d ed. 1988).
80 See, e.g., Spece, The Most Effective or Least Restrictive Alternative as the Only Intermediate
and Only Means-Focused Review in Due Process and Equal Protection, 33 VILL. L. REV. 11
(1988); see also G. GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWv 257 (4th ed.
1986) ("[B]y the 1980's, there remained ample basis for the widespread and justified
charge that the modern court's exercise of equal protection review has been erratic....
[The decisions] reveal a doctrinal landscape strewn with not always reconcilable frag-
ments."). See generally Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663, 665-66 (1977) (identifying some major attempts
at establishing a "unifying framework" to explain the Court's application of intermedi-
ate review).
81 Justice Marshall has been a major force in this area of law, arguing since the early
1970s that the Court's equal protection decisions defy the "easy categorization" of two
"neat" tiers:
A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has ap-
plied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly viola-
tive of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends
variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize par-
ticular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and so-
cietal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn.
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
Several other justices now apparently agree with Justice Marshall. Justice White
expressly endorsed the "spectrum of standards" position in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined Justice
Marshall's opinion in Cleburne which declared: "it is important to articulate, as the Court
does not, the facts and principles thatjustify ... this ... heightened scrutiny .... The
opinion later reiterated that "the level of scrutiny employed in an equal protection case
should vary ...." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 456,
460 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
Indeed, Justice Marshall's 67-page dissent in Rodriguez, containing the most elabo-
rate articulation of this position, arguably is proving more influential than the majority
opinion itself. Several commentators believe that the Court, in Plyler and Cleburne, actu-
ally adopted the 'sliding scale' approach. See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 968-69; Note, A
Changing Equal Protection Standard? The Supreme Court's Application of a Heightened Scrutiny
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quiry into the relevance of the classification would be the most prin-
cipled approach. 2 Very few, however, would claim that the Court
in the late 1980s only applies a rigid two-tiered analysis, automati-
cally upholding state action subject to rational basis review while
striking down state action subject to strict scrutiny.83
A. The Emerging Heightened Scrutiny in a School Setting
Education cases in particular reflect this gradual shift toward a
middle level of judicial review. Although a majority of Supreme
Court justices have steadfastly refused to extend fundamental rights
recognition to education, 84 the Court has been less than deferential
to school districts and states in reviewing disputed actions and poli-
cies under a fourteenth amendment framework.
The decision in Vlandis v. Kline8 5 represents one of the earliest
examples of intermediate review in an education context. Relying
on both the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses, a group
of Connecticut students challenged a statute which enabled the state
university to charge them a higher nonresident tuition.86 Under the
statute, once they had enrolled as out-of-state students, they were
forever precluded from qualifying for the lower in-state rate even if
they later moved into Connecticut as residents. Although the right
to equal educational opportunity was not specifically mentioned, the
Rational Basis Test in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 921, 971
(1987) (authored by Ellen E. Halfon). See also infra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
82 Justice Stevens began to define this position in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976), arguing that "there is only one Equal Protection Clause.... It does not direct
the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in
other cases." Id. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring). A decade later, joined by Chief
Justice Burger in Cleburne, he reiterated that he has "never been persuaded that these so-
called 'standards' adequately explain the decisional process." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451
(Stevens,J., concurring). Justice Stevens described in some detail a method of analyzing
equal protection cases under one standard, and expressly rejected the idea that the
Court applies any form of intermediate review. See id. at 452-54.
See also Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146,
1154 (1987): "Rather than focusing on the abstract categorization of classifications, Jus-
tice Stevens conducts a case-by-case inquiry into the 'relevance' of the classification to a
valid public purpose."
83 See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 968; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 79, at 1610 ("In
any event, there seems little likelihood that equal protection analysis will ever again be
neatly separable into two dramatically polar forms of review; whatever formulas they
announce, judges are understandably reluctant to constrain themselves with a method
that leaves them no choice between total affirmation and total negation.").
84 See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, supra note 80, at 255. Several states, however, have ex-
tended fundamental rights recognition to education under the equal protection clauses
of state constitutions. See supra note 12. See generally Mosk, Beyond the Constitution, 7 CA-
LIF. LAw., Aug. 1987, at 100 (noting distinctions between state and federal constitutional
jurisprudence).
85 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
86 Id. at 442-45.
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denial of equal opportunity to these students was clearly a major
underlying concern, since the continuing imposition of a signifi-
cantly higher tuition infringed upon their ability as state residents
(vis-a-vis other similarly situated state residents) to complete their
education at a public university. 87
Relying on cases that had overturned statutes creating conclu-
sive presumptions, 88 the Court held for the plaintiffs, declaring that
"it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the
resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable pre-
sumption of nonresidence ....",,9
In a pivotal concurring opinion, Justice White argued that the
Vlandis case is more correctly viewed as an example of heightened
judicial review triggered by an important interest. "[I]t is clear," he
wrote, "that we employ not just one, or two, but, as my Brother
Marshall has so ably demonstrated, a 'spectrum of standards in re-
viewing discrimination allegedly violative of the . .. [fourteenth
amendment]' "90 "[I]t must now be obvious," he continued, "or
has been all along, that, as the Court's assessment of the weight and
value of the individual interest escalates, the less likely it is that
mere administrative convenience.., will be sufficient to justify what
otherwise would appear to be irrational discriminations."' 1
Under a traditional rational basis standard, the Court would
have presumed the Connecticut law to be valid, and "any conceiva-
ble basis" would have been sufficient to uphold it.92 Yet not only
did the Vlandis Court analyze the facts from the plaintiff's perspec-
tive, 93 but Justice Stewart suggested that the students must be pro-
vided a chance "to demonstrate that they had become bona fide...
residents." 94 Although the majority opinion did not explicitly dis-
cuss the level of judicial review it had employed, Justice White ad-
dressed the issue in his concurrence. "Here," he asserted, "it is
enough for me that the interest involved is that of obtaining a
higher education, and that the State, without sufficient justification
87 Id.
88 Id. at 446-47. The Court relied heavily on Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971),
and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
89 Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 452.
90 Id. at 458 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion
in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973).
91 Id. at 459.
92 See, e.g., Note, supra note 81, at 956 (describing judicial review under the tradi-
tional rational basis test).
93 See Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 448-52. Professor Tribe argues that an "altering of per-
spective" alone can be viewed as a form of intermediate review. See L. TRIBE, supra note
79, at 1604.
94 Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 453.
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* . .[maintains] . . .this... pattern of discrimination."9 5
In Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,96 the Court con-
sidered the interests of a public university student under a substan-
tive due process approach. 97 The medical school had dismissed
Scott Ewing after he failed a qualifying examination, and Ewing ar-
gued that the University had violated his fourteenth amendment
rights because he was the first student who had not been allowed a
second opportunity to take the test.9s The university defended its
actions by claiming that the plaintiff's decidedly "unenviable" aca-
demic record, combined with the failing score on the NBME test,
provided sufficient justification for dismissal.99
The only federal interest specifically mentioned in this case was
a "constitutionally protectible property right in continued enroll-
ment... free from arbitrary state action." 100 Underlying the plain-
tiff's position, however, was the same interest in public education
that Justice White identified in Vlandis, 10 bolstered by a similarly
unstated denial of equal educational opportunity: the denial of "the
opportunity" to retake the NBME. 10 2
95 1d. at 459. Justice Stewart's majority opinion cited the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine, which is that an irrebuttable presumption violates the Due Process Clause of
the fourteenth amendment unless the presumed fact "necessarily or universally" follows
from the proved fact. See id. at 452. (For example, in Vlandis, the fact that the students
were not currently in-state residents does not follow necessarily or universally from the
proved fact that they were not in-state residents the previous year.) Initially, most of the
commentary concerning Viandis focused on this doctrine and on the extent to which it
remained in effect. Many concluded that the doctrine as originally formulated had be-
come discredited. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975). See generally
Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975) (authored
byJohn M. Phillips). Today, however, it appears that the precedential value of these so-
called "irrebuttable presumption" cases may very well center on their method of giving
effect to "substantial, cognizable" interests. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (where the Court analyzed the nature and extent of plaintiff's interests).
Professor Gunther declares that "the [irrebuttable presumption] approach may sur-
vive for use where there are independent reasons for heightened scrutiny, as when 'fun-
damental interests' are affected." G. GUNTHER, supra note 80, at 520 n.4.
96 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
97 Id at 222. The Court stated: "We [previously] assumed, without deciding, that
federal courts can review an academic decision of a public educational institution under
a substantive due process standard .... We ... accept the University's invitation to
'assume the existence of a constitutionally protectible [sic] property right in [Ewing's]
continued enrollment ....'
For an excellent overview of the fluctuations in the Court's willingness to find for a
plaintiff under substantive due process, as well as an analysis of the approach's alleged
return to favor in recent years, see Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment,
77 MicH. L. REV. 981 (1979).
98 Ewing, 474 U.S. at 215-19.
99 Id. at 227.
100 Id at 223.
101 412 U.S. at 459 (White, J., concurring).
102 Ewing, 474 U.S. at 219.
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Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens explained that
"[c]onsiderations of profound importance counsel restrained judi-
cial review . ... ,,10 "This narrow avenue for judicial review," he
continued, "precludes any conclusion that the decision.., was such
a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demon-
strate that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment."1 0 4
Some would argue that by employing this language Stevens was
using a rational basis standard. 10 5 Yet an analysis of the Ewing
Court's approach reveals that Stevens's inquiry might be closer to
heightened scrutiny. The test articulated by the Court focused on
whether or not the state action was a substantial departure from
"accepted academic norms." This suggests that if the educators'
acts were indeed a substantial departure, the Court would hold for
the plaintiff. Under the rational basis approach, however, even such
a substantial departure would likely result in a decision against the
plaintiff. The rational relationship test has traditionally been so def-
erential that "the state" (or "academic institution") would prevail if
it could demonstrate "any conceivable basis" for its actions, even if
these actions were significant departures from "the norm." 106
In addition, the traditional rational basis standard presumes a
valid purpose, and the state is not required to convince the Court of
the wisdom of its actions. 10 7 Yet in Ewing, even though the Court
emphasized the necessity of deferring to "genuine[ ] academic deci-
sions"108 and eventually upheld the student's dismissal, the defer-
ence was by no means automatic. The Court fully explored the
wisdom of the university's action, expressly analyzed the facts "from
Ewing's perspective," and examined the policy reasons behind the
university's decision at length. 10 9 Given the extent of this policy re-
view, it is reasonable to conclude that the Ewing Court did more
than simply apply a minimal rationality standard. 110
103 Id. at 225.
104 Id. at 227.
105 See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 5, at 359-60 n.60; cf Ew-
ing, 474 U.S. at 227 n.13 ("Even viewing the case from Ewing's perspective, we cannot
say that the explanations and extenuating circumstances he offered were so compelling
that their rejection can fairly be described as irrational.").
106 See, e.g., supra note 92 and accompanying text.
107 See Note, supra note 81, at 956.
108 Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 ("When judges . . . review . . . a genuinely academic
decision, . . . they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment.
Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted
academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not
actually exercise professional judgment.").
109 Id. at 227-28 n.13.
110 For a discussion of this "covertly heightened scrutiny" approach, see Note, supra
note 81, at 956-57. See also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 478 (Marshall, J., concurring and dis-
senting); L. TRINE, supra note 79, at 1443-46.
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell acknowledged that by
recognizing the existence of a constitutionally protected interest
under a substantive due process framework, the Court was required
to employ "particularly careful scrutiny.""' Agreeing with the deci-
sion against the plaintiff, but not willing to support the Court's
"fundamental rights" approach, he attempted to limit the preceden-
tial value of the Ewing majority opinion. Powell argued that the
plaintiff had nothing more than a "state-law contract right."' 12 He
asserted that "the fact that Michigan may have labeled this interest
'property' [does not entitle] it to join those other, far more impor-
tant interests that have heretofore been accorded the protection of
substantive due process."" 13 The language in Powell's concurrence
provides further support for the position that the Court will give
effect to certain important interests under an emerging heightened
scrutiny framework.
The handicapped rights cases of the 1980s provide yet another
example of "fundamental rights" analysis, giving effect to plaintiffs'
interests under an indirect application of the fourteenth amend-
ment. These cases typically focus on the construction of statutory
entitlements granted to students within the context of equal protec-
tion. Since the newly acquired rights of the handicapped have been
codified with the express purpose of "assur[ing] equal protection of
the law," 1 4 the statutes tend to be construed by applying four-
teenth amendment principles and methodology.
Key cases in this area follow the familiar pattern. They recog-
nize an important interest in education bolstered by a right to equal
opportunity, and then proceed to review state action under a height-
ened level of scrutiny. In Board of Education v. Rowley," 5 for exam-
ple, the Court examined the parameters of a handicapped student's
"interest." Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, concluded
that the equal protection specified in the Act required a "basic floor
of opportunity," consisting of "access" to specialized instruction
and related services."16
At one point, the Court invoked the traditional deference of the
rational basis test, acknowledging that "the courts must be careful
'Ml Ewing, 474 U.S. at 229 (Powell, J., concurring).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1461 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter the Education of the Handicapped Act, or Public Law 94-142]. Section 1400(b)(9)
provides, "It is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and
local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children
in order to assure equal protection of the law."
115 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
116 Id. at 201-03. See also supra notes 34-60 and accompanying text.
1093
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods
upon the States." 117 Yet, in ruling for the board of education, the
Court did not automatically defer to the school district's judgment.
As the majority had done in both Vlandis and Plyler and would soon
do in Ewing, 1 8 the Court in Rowley explored the policy reasons un-
derlying the district's decision in great detail." 9
Although the Rowley Court did not specifically refer to Craig v.
Boren,' 20 it can be argued that it applied the same standard of
heightened scrutiny. In Craig, the Court had recognized an interme-
diate level of scrutiny in the context of gender discrimination.12 '
The test under this heightened standard of review was whether the
state classification served "important governmental objectives" and
was "substantially related to achievement of those objectives."' 122 In
Rowley, the Court examined the objectives underlying the handi-
capped student's statutory interest at great length, and then pro-
vided a detailed analysis of the school district's justification for its
actions in light of these objectives.' 23 Finally, it concluded that the
state action in the present case did in fact "fit" the objectives. 124
Similarly, in the recent case of Honig v. Doe,125 the Court consid-
ered whether "local school authorities may ... unilaterally exclude
disabled children from the classroom for dangerous or disruptive
conduct growing out of their disabilities."' 126 Justice Brennan re-
viewed the legislative history of Public Law 94-142, and concluded
that Congress was "aware that the schools all too often had denied"
emotionally disturbed children access to the classroom.' 27 The
Court recognized that the twenty and thirty-day suspensions im-
posed by San Francisco school officials constituted just the sort of
actions the statute was designed to prevent.' 28
117 Id. at 207.
118 See supra notes 89, 109, and infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
119 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-10.
120 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
121 Id. at 197.
122 Id.
123 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 187-97.
124 Id. at 209-10 ("[T]he 'evidence firmly establishes that Amy is receiving an 'ade-
quate' education, since she performs better than the average child in her class and is
advancing easily from grade to grade..... In light of this finding, and of the fact that
Amy was receiving personalized instruction and related services calculated by the...
school administrators to meet her educational needs .... the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.") (quoting Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 580, 583
(1980)).
125 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
126 Id. at 308.
127 Id. at 309-11.
128 Id. at 323, 326. Arguably, the Honig Court employed two different techniques of
intermediate review: the form of "demanding close fit" described above, and the
method of "assessing importance" by weighing the respective interests of the parties.
[Vol. 74:10781094
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The handicapped rights cases thus provide another variation of
fundamental rights analysis at the intersection of due process and
equal protection.' 29 Since the Education of the Handicapped Act
has emerged from a due process and equal protection framework,' 30
judges construing the extent of this statutory protection often apply
the assumptions and rationales of previous fourteenth amendment
decisions. In both Rowley and Honig, the Court appears to recognize
implicitly that handicapped students' rights are important enough to
trigger heightened scrutiny in the same manner that the rights of
the female plaintiff in Craig v. Boren triggered heightened scrutiny
for gender discrimination.13 '
B. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools and the Applicability of
the Plyler Framework
Read together with the above cases, Plyler v. Doe 13 2 can be
See L. TRIBE, supra note 79, at 1602-03. "In the present case," Justice Brennan wrote in
Honig, "we are satisfied that the District Court ... properly balanced respondent's inter-
est in receiving a free appropriate public education... against the interests of the state
and local school officials in maintaining a safe learning environment .... 108 S. Ct. at
606; see also Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984), where the Court
applied the Rowley analysis and held that the school district was indeed required under
Public Law 94-142 "to provide a handicapped child with clean intermittent catheteriza-
tion during school hours." Id. at 885.
129 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Professor Lupu provides additional clar-
ification of the Court's fundamental rights analysis in this regard. See Lupu, supra note
97, at 984:
Which new rights properly derive from the liberty strand, and which from
the equality strand? Sometimes the Court tells us; other times it does
not. Often, members of the Court agree upon the preferred status of an
interest but disagree about its textual source. On occasion, members of
the Court concede that an interest has no textual source, yet battle still
over which strand of the fourteenth amendment protects it from state
interference.
Many times, the Court appears to be applying the two clauses simultaneously. See
Note, Equal Protection: A Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny, 76 MICH. L. REV. 771, 791 (1978)
("equal protection is often substantive due process in disguise").
In Vlandis v. Kline, the plaintiffs argued their case under both due process and equal
protection theories. While the majority then gave effect to plaintiff's interests under
due process alone, Justice White would have applied fundamental rights analysis under
an equal protection theory. 412 U.S. 441, 456-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring). In
Plyler v. Doe, the majority gave effect to plaintiffs' interests solely under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause (see 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982)), and in Ewing solely under Due Process. See
474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985).
130 See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874-75 (D.D.C. 1972). See also
Colley, The Education for all Handicapped Children Act: A Statutory and Legal Analysis, 10 J.L.
& EDUC. 137, 139-43 (1981) (explaining that the right to an education for handicapped
children arises from both federal and statutory sources); Note, The Right of Handicapped
Children to an Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 525-42 (1974)
(authored by Robert L. Flanagan) (asserting the nexus between education and other
fundamental rights as the basis of handicapped persons' right to an education).
131 See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
132 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
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viewed as much more than simply an isolated, result-oriented deci-
sion. 133 The heightened scrutiny employed by the Plyler Court, bal-
ancing a recognized student interest against the interests of the
school district and the state, 134 cannot simply be dismissed as a
unique confluence of theories when other decisions have employed
techniques of heightened review triggered at least in part by an ex-
press or implied denial of equal educational opportunity.
Under this emerging framework, intermediate judicial review is
applied to protect burdened classes that have been denied these im-
portant interests.' 35 A favorable decision in a school setting typi-
cally requires the identification of at least (1) the important interest
in education, (2) the right to equal opportunity, and (3) an arguably
burdened class of injured plaintiffs. In Vlandis,136 for example, the
interest in education plus an unstated right to interstate travel' 37
combined with the identification of an implicated class of out-of-
state students 138 to generate intermediate judicial review. In Plyler,
the impact of the general interest in education and the specific right
to equal opportunity was bolstered by the fact that the injured plain-
tiffs all belonged to a disadvantaged class of undocumented alien
children. 139
133 Chief Justice Burger called Plyler an "unabashedly result-oriented" case,
"spin[ning] out a theory custom-tailored to the facts ..... Id at 244 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
134 See id. at 221-31. The "weighing of interests" in the Plyler case has been ex-
amined at length by several excellent commentaries. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at
970-71. See generally Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe,
1982 SuP. CT. REV. 167.
135 See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 134, at 169. See also Karst, The Supreme Court,
1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. t ,
2, 26-33 (1977) (identifying components of this framework at an earlier stage of its de-
velopment).
Although the framework typically requires a combination of important interests plus
disabling classifications, some have argued that the identification of an important inter-
est alone can trigger intermediate judicial review. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 79, at
1610-13.
The identification of a burdened class alone, without the presence of an important
interest, has been sufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny if the classification has been
deemed "quasi-suspect." In recent times, the Supreme Court has extended quasi-sus-
pect status to gender and illegitimacy. See generally Note, Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of
Discriminatory Intent. A New Model, 90 YALE L.J. 912, 914-19 (1981) (describing the ambi-
guity in the Supreme Court's criteria for determining quasi-suspect status).
136 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
137 Professor Tribe identifies this unstated interest in his analysis of the Vlandis case.
See L. TRIBE, supra note 79, at 1623 n.35.
138 See Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 442-45. In addition, students who were not married were
placed at an additional disadvantage, arguably resulting in an additional implicated class
of unmarried out-of-state students. See id. at 442.
139 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-20 (1982); see also Hutchinson, supra note
134, at 175.
A growing body of research has documented the courts' willingness to consider a
1096 [Vol. 74:1078
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Although the Court has ostensibly put a halt to the creation of
new "fundamental interests" which trigger strict -scrutiny, the door
apparently remains open for the identification of "important" inter-
ests which could trigger heightened judicial review. 140 Justice
White's language in Vlandis continues to be an appropriate descrip-
tion of this framework. The greater the weight and value of the in-
terest, the more difficult it is to justify state action that may infringe
upon this interest. 14 1 Professor Peter Westen, emphasizing the cen-
tral role of rights analysis in all fourteenth amendment decisions, 142
has argued that the degree ofjudicial scrutiny in a given case is de-
termined by the acknowledged importance of the underlying
right. 143 Commentators have also pinpointed various methods of
review employed by the Court once heightened scrutiny has been
triggered. 144 Professor Laurence Tribe has cataloged six major tech-
niques of intermediate review. 145
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools146 presented the Court with
an ideal set of circumstances for an application of this new height-
combination of several classes and interests before determining the appropriate level of
review. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 44, at 206.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), conceivably re-
flects such a combination. In Cleburne, the Court overturned the city's denial of a use
permit to a group of mentally retarded people who had wished to live in a group home.
Two disabling classifications (economic disadvantage and mental disability) combine
with at least one important interest (the right to shelter) to generate a level of review
that has been labeled "covertly heightened scrutiny." See supra note 110 and accompa-
nying text.
140 See, e.g., Gelfand, The Constitutional Position of American Local Government: Retrospect
for the Burger Court and Prospect for the Rehnquist Court, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 635, 642-
44 (1987) (explaining the potential for "creative litigation" in this area of the law); see
also Note, A Right to Shelter for the Homeless in New York State, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 272 (1986)
(authored by Christine Robitscher Ladd Lord) (outlining a framework under the New
York State Constitution for a "quasi-fundamental interest" in housing).
Professor Kirp identified the viability of a "quasi-fundamental interests" approach
the same year that the Rodriguez Court expressly refused to grant education "fundamen-
tal interest" status. See Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implications of
Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 722 (1973) ("Even if the 'fundamental inter-
est' analysis is abandoned by the Court, a weighing of state and individual concerns
more precise and careful than that adopted in Rodriguez, and more typical of other recent
Supreme Court decisions, may ultimately prevail.").
141 Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 459.
142 See Westen, supra note 78, at 542 ("[S]tatements of equality logically entail (and
necessarily collapse into) simpler statements of rights; and ... the additional step of
transforming simple statements of rights into statements of equality not only involves
unnecessary work but also engenders profound conceptual confusion.").
143 See id at 584-85.
144 See, e.g., Simson, supra note 80, at 663-66; Spece, supra note 80, at 118-20.
145 See L. TRIBE, supra note 79, at 1601-10. Professor Tribe's catalogue of height-
ened scrutiny techniques includes (1) Assessing Importance, (2) Demanding Close Fit,
(3) Altering Perspective, (4) Requiring Current Articulation, (5) Limiting Afterthought,
and (6) Permitting Rebuttal. Id
146 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988).
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ened scrutiny. The important interest in education was at stake, and
the plaintiffs were part of a disadvantaged class of people: those at
or near the poverty line.147 Justice Marshall noted that "the Plyler
Court's reasoning is fully applicable here. As in Plyler, the State...
has acted to burden the educational opportunities of a disadvan-
taged group of children, who need an education to become full par-
ticipants in society."' 148 Justice O'Connor, however, attempted to
distinguish Plyler, ignoring Justice Brennan's majority opinion and
looking instead to the concurring and dissenting opinions in sup-
port of her assertion that the 1982 case dealt with "unique circum-
stances." "The case before us does not resemble Ply/er," she
concluded, "and we decline to extend the rationale of that decision
to cover this case." 149
Ironically, had the Kadrmas Court chosen instead to "extend"
Plyler, the disposition might very well have been the same. An exam-
ination of the facts reveals that the plaintiff's case may not have
been that strong. The Kadrmas family apparently failed to request
that the school board waive the $97-per-year fee, a procedure ex-
pressly made available under a North Dakota statute. 150 Instead, the
plaintiffs arranged to transport their daughter privately, incurring
costs of more than $1,000 per year in 1985 and 1986.151 Sarita
Kadrmas was not, therefore, denied any education; she continued to
attend school throughout the course of litigation. 152
Applying heightened scrutiny, the Court could have balanced
these facts against those that supported the plaintiff's cause. Such
an analysis would have included the recognition that most students
in North Dakota are provided with free bus transportation, 153 and
that the money collected by the Dickinson Public School District for
transporting indigent families represents "a minuscule proportion
of the costs of the bus service."' 154 All this could have been consid-
ered in light of the unusual emphasis on school transportation
throughout the North Dakota statutes, an emphasis designed to en-
sure that all students in this rural, sparsely populated state can in-
deed get to school. 155
An intermediate level of review in Kadrmas would have been a
more equitable approach for the complicated and wide-ranging
147 Id. at 2484-88.
148 Id. at 2494 (Marshall, J, dissenting).
149 Id. at 2488.
150 See id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-43-11.2 (1981).
151 Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2485.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 2494.
154 Id.
155 See id. at 2484-85.
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problems that arise in a school setting. Although the Court rejected
such an approach on the facts of Kadrmas, it did not expressly fore-
close future applications of Plyler. In a closely reasoned opinion that
avoided broad pronouncements, Justice O'Connor simply con-
cluded that it would not be appropriate to apply the heightened
scrutiny framework in the present case.' 56
The majority apparently hesitated to rule in Sarita Kadrmas's
favor because she was not injured in any perceivable way. With a
stronger case, however, a Supreme Court majority may be comforta-
ble applying Plyler and openly recognizing the existence of interme-
diate judicial review in an education context. Plaintiffs initiating
future litigation under the emerging heightened scrutiny must be
certain to delineate an actual injury resulting from a denial of equal
opportunity and a deprivation of education. The related areas of
testing and curriculum are particularly ripe for such litigation.
III
PROSPECTIVE LITIGATION IN A SCHOOL SETTING: TOWARD
AN EXPRESS RECOGNITION OF THE NEW
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
Despite a stated unwillingness to impose their own views of ed-
ucation on the public school community, 157 the judiciary has contin-
ued to shape educational policy simply by reviewing the practices of
school districts and states. 158 School-related cases have increased
significantly in both volume and scope, raising new types of issues
and creating new constitutional theories. 159 Every decision in these
cases affects the policies of educators in some fashion.
Even in an era when judicial activism has allegedly become dis-
favored, 6 0 litigation in an education context remains a key vehicle
for change. The courts cannot and will not ignore plaintiffs who
come before them with grievous school-related injuries.
Many students have been injured by public school practices in
156 See generally id at 2487-89.
157 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1972):
Education . . . presents a myriad of 'intractable economic, social, and
even philosophical problems ... .' In such circumstances, the judiciary is
well advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitu-
tional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued re-
search and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to
educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing
conditions.
158 See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS 3
(1982).
159 See D. TYACK, J. JAMES & A. BENAVOT, supra note 6, at 196-97.
160 See generally Wright, The Judicial Right and the Rhetoric of Restraint: A Defense ofJudi-
cial Activism in an Age of Conservative Judges, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1987).
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the related areas of testing and curriculum. Under the Plyler frame-
work, prospective litigation in these areas could point toward an ex-
press recognition of the new heightened scrutiny, and could seek to
effect significant changes in both standardized testing programs and
curricular policy. The remedies of declaratory and injunctive relief
would relieve the aggrieved plaintiff, while the very process of scru-
tinizing these policies may prompt significant changes in this
area.161
The "fundamental rights" approach set forth in Plyler begins
with the identification of important interests, notes the existence of
a disabling classification, and assesses the consequences of the dep-
rivation.t 62 Whether an intermediate level of review is triggered by
this combination in a school setting appears to depend on three fac-
tors: (1) denial of equal opportunity, 16 3 (2) a disabling classifica-
tion, 164 and (3) a case-by-case examination of the consequences of
deprivation. 165
A. Students Injured by Current Testing Practices
It is impossible to ignore the central role that the machine-
scored, multiple-choice test has played in our educational system
since the end of World War 11.166 By the early 1960s, the "far-
reaching effects of the... emphasis on such standardized tests" had
already been documented. 167 "[Flew people realize," Professor
Banesh Hoffmann wrote, "[that] these tests have become the domi-
nant factor in educational research; they furnish the yardstick-in-
deed the very definition-of 'progress.' "168
During the past twenty-five years, educators have developed an
161 See Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1988, at B13, col. 2 (alluding to
"Heisenberg's uncertainty principle," that "the very process of scrutinizing something
changes it"). Thus, even if a plaintiff should lose on the merits but succeed in convinc-
ing the Court to apply heightened scrutiny to education, policy changes in the areas of
testing and curriculum are likely to emerge.
162 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-24. See generally supra notes 65-77 and accompanying
text (an overview of the Plyler framework).
163 See id.; see also supra notes 27-51 and accompanying text (an analysis of the right to
equal educational opportunity).
164 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
165 See id. at 221-24.
166 The continued growth and extensive influence of multiple-choice testing is re-
flected in the history of the Educational Testing Service (ETS). The first multiple-choice
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) was added by ETS to the U.S. "college boards" in 1926,
and the essay portion was dropped altogether in 1942 (ostensibly because the outbreak
of World War II had made it difficult to recruit graders). After various "unsatisfying"
experiments with essay sections and "writing samples" in the 1950s and 1960s, only an
optional twenty-minute essay was retained. See D. OWEN, NONE OF THE ABOVE 18-26
(1985).
167 See B. HOFFMANN, THE TYRANNY OF TESTING 215 (1964).
168 Id.
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even greater reliance on multiple-choice testing. 169 State-mandated
competency and proficiency tests are administered regularly in the
public schools, with dire results for those who do not perform
well. 170 The highly publicized education reform movement of the
1980s has triggered still more testing,' 71 and test data has become
"the primary indicator in monitoring the success or failure... of the
169 See Airasian, State Mandated Testing and Education Reform: Context and Consequences,
95 AM.J. EDUC. 393-412 (1987).
170 See Fiske, America's Test Mania, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1988, § 12 (Education Sup-
plement), at 16-17:
[Test] scores ... are increasingly being used to promote and hold back
students, hire and fire teachers, award diplomas, evaluate curriculums,
and dole out money to schools and colleges.... The actual number of
states requiring students to pass a standardized test for high school grad-
uation has jumped from 15 in 1985 to 24 in 1987, while the number using
them to help determine whether students should be promoted has gone
from eight to 12 during the same period.
Professor Airasian adds that
[by the mid-1980s,] 29 states required that pupils take competency or
proficiency tests at selected points on the educational ladder.... Thirty-
two states [required] teachers to pass a standardized competency exami-
nation in order to obtain or maintain their certification to teach. Other
states [used] pupil standardized test results to allocate remedial funding
to local school districts and to award 'bonuses' to schools based on year-
to-year pupil test score improvement.
See Airasian, supra note 169, at 393-94.
171 See, e.g., Fiske, supra note 170, at 16, col. 1 (describing the "reform movement's
biggest side effect-the burgeoning use of standardized tests").
Most agree that the education reform movement "officially" began in 1983 with "A
Nation at Risk, the report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education,"
which "shattered complacency about the state of American education" with its detailed
documentation of "mediocrity" in the public schools. See Olson, Inside 'A Nation at Risk,'
Educ. Week, Apr. 27, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
During this era, the status quo in our educational system became unacceptable. Ed-
ucators and elected officials on both ends of the political spectrum sought to forge a
consensus, united in a new "commitment to excellence," even as they continued to disa-
gree on the relative importance and inherent workability of the various reform propos-
als. See generally E. STEVNS & G. WOOD, supra note 30, chs. 12-14 (placing the current
wave of reform in historical perspective by examining past movements). See also Pipho,
States Move Reform Closer to Reality: A Special Report, 68 PHI DELTA KAPPAN KI, K5 (Dec.
1986) (highlights of state legislative action reflecting the unifying themes of the reform
movement: "more rigorous standards for students and more recognition and higher
standards for teachers").
For a sampling of notable achievements and promising blueprints for future action,
see Tomorrow's Teachers: A Report of the Holmes Group (1986); A Nation Prepared Teachers for
the Twenty-first Century (1986) ("The Report of the Task Force on Teaching as a Profes-
sion," commonly known as "The Carnegie Report"); Sizer, Rebuilding: First Steps by the
Coalition of Essential Schools, 68 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 38-42 (Sept. 1986); Who Will Teach Our
Children? A Strategy for Improving California's Schools (1985) ("The Report of the California
Commission on the Teaching Profession," generally known as The Commons Commis-
sion Report) (extensively documented in Biegel, supra note 47, at 830-33).
See also A. PowELL, E. FARRAR & D. COHEN, THE SHOPPING MALL HIGH SCHOOL
(1985); E. BOYER, HIGH SCHOOL (1983); M. ADLER, THE PAIDEA PROPOSAL: AN EDUCA-
TIONAL MANIFESTO (1982) (three particularly influential books an education reform).
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American educational system."1 72 Multiple-choice tests today are
often "the primary or sole piece of information used in [educa-
tional] decision making.' 173
Relying almost exclusively on multiple-choice tests that have
been prepared by an unregulated industry,1 74 school districts and
states acquire statistical profiles of students that are often incorrect
or incomplete. Not only does the current multiple-choice format
embody inherent limitations,1 75 but the predictive value of a given
test score varies due to the idiosyncratic nature of standardized for-
mats.' 76 Key "hidden variables," such as an examinee's personal
background and her possible exposure to certain teaching styles,
must be taken into account when attempting to make appropriate
inferences from test scores. 177 Yet, all too often, one score alone
determines admission to a special school, 178 eligibility for a particu-
lar school program, 79 placement in an advanced track,'80 or even
172 Airasian, supra note 169, at 402-03. Indeed, it has become customary for local
newspapers to display the latest standardized test scores of the local public schools in
prominent fashion. See, e.g., L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, § 2, at 1, col. 1. These scores
become, for all practical purposes, the only basis for comparing school success or
failure.
173 Airasian, supra note 169, at 394. See, e.g., Barzun, Multiple Choice Flunks Out, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 11, 1988, at A31, col. 1, referring to multiple-choice testing as "the central
feature of modern schooling": "This test... dominates teachers' and students' minds.
Passing and failing, ratings of teachers and schools, national and state rankings, the rise
and fall of literacy, admission to college and other institutions-all hang upon this in-
strument peculiar to our century."
See generally Gold, Extensive Tests in Indiana Make Teachers Uneasy, Educ. Week, Apr.
13, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (describing what "may be the most sweeping [standardized testing
program] in the nation, both in terms of the number of grades it includes and the extent
to which results are used to require ... placement and retention").
174 See, e.g., The Testing Explosion, Boston Globe, June 19, 1988, at 94, col. 2.
175 See, e.g., Barzun, supra note 173, at col. 2 ("Multiple-choice questions test nothing
but passive-recognition knowledge, not active usable knowledge."); see also Fiske, supra
note 170, at 19, col. 2 ("[Multiple-choice tests] measure how good students are at recog-
nizing information, not generating it. 'It's testing for the TV generation-superficial
and passive.... We don't ask if students can synthesize information, solve problems or
think independently.' " (quoting Linda Darling Hammond, director of Education for the
Rand Corporation)).
176 See Madaus, Minimum Competency Testing for Certification: The Evolution and Evalua-
tion of Test Validity, in G. MADAUS, THE COURTS, VALIDITY, AND MINIMUM COMPETENCY
TESTING 32 (1983).
177 Madaus has pointed out that a student's lack of ability or low achievement are
only two of many possible explanations for a low test score. Other possible reasons
include the lack of opportunity to learn the material, the quality and methodology of
classroom instruction, and one or more additional variables in the following areas: cog-
nitive, attitudinal, affective, health, nutritional, social, and ecological. See id. at 32, 47.
178 See, e.g., Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1974).
179 See, e.g., N. MEDINA & D. NEILL, FALLOUT FROM THE TESTING EXPLOSION 15 (1988)
(a publication of the National Center for Fair and Open Testing) ("In many schools,
standardized tests serve as gatekeepers for ... admission to gifted and talented or accel-
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the ability groupings within a specific classroom.181
1. Denial of Equal Opportunity: Testing as an Unreasonable
Obstacle
Under the Plyler framework, a denial of equal educational op-
portunity has occurred when "barriers present[ ] unreasonable ob-
stacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit."'182 Plaintiff
students could argue that both the inferior testing instruments and
the practice of admitting and placing young people on the basis of
incorrect or incomplete assessments amount to unreasonable
obstacles. 8 3
Whether these "obstacles" are deemed unreasonable may de-
pend on the existence of viable alternatives. 8 4 In response to criti-
cism of multiple-choice testing, school districts typically point to the
alleged efficiency of the multiple-choice format and the supposed
absence of alternative approaches.' 8 5 Yet during the past decade,
significant advances in microcomputer technology have triggered
the development of many reasonable testing alternatives, including
more precise measurement techniques using traditional formats as
erated programs."). See also Carmody, Debate Intensifying on Screening Tests before Kindergar-
ten, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
180 See, e.g., Oakes, Keeping Track, Part 1. The Policy and Practice of Curriculum Inequality,
68 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 12, 13 (September 1986). See generally infra notes 241-42 and ac-
companying text.
181 Teachers commonly group students according to ability within a given class. El-
ementary school teachers, for example, typically divide students into groups for reading
and mathematics. See, e.g., Drowatzky, Tracking and Ability Grouping in Education, 10J.L. &
EDUC. 43, 44-48 (1981).
182 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-22.
183 Prospective litigation under the Plyler framework would focus on the combined
effects of inferior test instruments and the faulty decisions based on scores from these
tests. Litigants wishing to focus on the validity of the test instrument alone may wish to
rely on the former Fifth Circuit's ruling in Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, reh'g
denied, 654 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff students, objecting to the new Florida
minimum competency tests, had sought injunctive relief under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses. After extensive testimony by prominent, nationally recog-
nized educators, the court came to the conclusion that a standardized test which lacked
validity would be "fundamentally unfair" and thus violative of substantive due process.
Id at 400-405.
Under the due process framework set forth by the Debra P. court, plaintiffs could
employ the emerging heightened scrutiny to challenge the validity of school testing pro-
grams in general. Although the Florida litigation specifically addressed minimum com-
petency testing, the court presented a wide-ranging analysis of fundamental fairness and
the recognized standards for determining the validity of all tests. Id. at 404-06. The
Fifth Circuit's conclusions thus are persuasive precedent in support of an assertion that
any public school testing program significantly affecting a student's future would be
violative of substantive due process if the test lacked content validity.
184 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
185 See, e.g., Madaus, supra note 176, at 41-48 (describing the allure of multiple-
choice testing).
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well as new evaluation instruments using innovative formats.18 6
The new technology may enable school districts to combine a vari-
ety of instruments and procedures, rather than relying exclusively
on any one type of test. 187
Teacher licensing, a major focus of current reform efforts, may
soon reflect these policy changes. In a surprising and unprece-
dented decision, the Educational Testing Service 88 recently an-
nounced that by 1992 it would replace its controversial and widely
criticized National Teachers Examination (NTE) with a new three-
part instrument that may employ interactive video, computer simu-
lations, and portfolios documenting teachers' accomplishments.18 9
2. The Disabling Status: Identifying an Implicated Class
Although certain fundamental rights will trigger strict or
heightened scrutiny without the identification of a disadvantaged
186 See, e.g., Birenbaum, "How "-Beyond the "What, "Towards the "Why" A Rule-Assess-
ment Approach to Achievement Testing, 12 STUD. IN EDUC. EVALUATION 159-68 (1986) (rule
assessment tests which go beyond an analysis of whether a student has mastered a skill
to inquire into the rules that a student may be learning incorrectly and thus using to
generate an incorrect answer); Bruno, Assessing the Knowledge Base of Students: An Informa-
tion Theoretic Approach to Testing, 19 MEASUREMENT & EVALUATION IN COUNSELING AND DE-
VELOPMENT (1986) ("MCW-APM," an innovative scoring system designed to give
students partial credit for partial knowledge, and identify with greater precision both the
parameters of a student's understanding and the effectiveness of an instructional pro-
gram). Yen, Green & Burket, Valid Normative Information from Customized Achievement Tests,
6 EDUC. MEASUREMENT: ISSUES & PRAc. 7-13 (1987) ("Latent-Trait Item Generation,"
which customizes test items so that performance can be analyzed as if all of the students
were identical in ability).
See also Seven Ways of Knowing Not One, Educ. Week, Jan. 27, 1988, at 19 (discussing
Professor Howard Gardner's recent book, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE
INTELLIGENCES (1983), and describing his research-based findings that at least seven rel-
atively autonomous avenues of intelligence exist which educators can assess and moni-
tor in new and creative ways).
The State Bar of California may also be providing a service to educators in this
regard with the development of a new "performance test." This section of the Califor-
nia bar exam, developed in the early 1980's and modified in 1985, is designed to mea-
sure practical legal skills by assessing an examinee's ability to analyze legal problems
from a client file and generate memorandums similar to those required of practicing
attorneys. See California Bar Examination (1985-1989).
187 See generally M. KOURILSKY & L. QUARANTA, EFFECTIVE TEACHING: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE 41-47 (1987) (describing the variety of evaluation techniques available to edu-
cators, and indicating the advantages of using as many different instruments and proce-
dures as possible to assess student learning).
188 ETS, the largest testing company in the world, creates and administers such tests
as the SAT, GRE, GMAT, MCAT, LSAT, and the Multistate Bar Examination. See gener-
ally NAIRN, THE REIGN OF ETS: THE CORPORATION THAT MAKES UP MINDS (1980) (The
Ralph Nader Report) (revealing flaws in standardized testing by examining the impact of
Educational Testing Service). See also B. HOFFMAN, supra note 167 (providing a critical
analysis of the standardized testing industry and exposing the defects in that method of
examination).
189 See Fiske, Teachers' Exam, Often Criticized to be Replaced, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1988,
at Al.
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class, 190 the Plyler framework clearly requires such an identifica-
tion.191 Under Plyler the implicated group of students need not be
"suspect," but simply "a discrete class of children not accountable
for their disabling status."'192 This language provides great latitude
in identifying a "category" of injured students. Students who are
"not accountable for their disabling status" may include not only
such typical classifications as minority 93 and gender, 194 but also
such disputed classifications as wealth. 195 Indeed, there may even
be room for the identification of new burdened classes of students
who may not be accountable for their inability to perform well on
standardized tests.
Social science research has already provided support for the
identification of implicated classes in this context. Extensive studies
documenting cultural bias in standardized tests have served as the
basis for a successful challenge to a testing program at the state
level. 196 Recent findings have noted a consistent pattern of dispar-
ity in the standardized test scores of men and women, 197 and com-
mentators have begun to question whether tests based on the SAT
model discriminate on the basis of gender. 198 A growing body of
190 There are those who argue that, particularly under a substantive due process
theory, a plaintiff need only show that the defendant has infringed upon an important
interest. See, e.g.,J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 5, at 323, 529-31. See
also Lupu, supra note 97, at 998-99 (arguing that Roe v. Wade is most appropriately
viewed as a substantive due process case, and demonstrating that the important interest
itself was sufficient to trigger a form of fundamental rights analysis).
191 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-24.
192 Id at 223.
193 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hobson v. Hansen, 269
F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
194 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
195 See Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2491-94. See also supra notes 18-22 and accompanying
text.
For a graphic account of the effect that a disabling socioeconomic status can have
on children in America today, see Barbanel, How Despair Is Engulfing a Generation in New
York, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1989, at E6, col. 2. See generally Silk, Rich and Poor: The Gap
Widens, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1989, at C2, col. 1.
196 See Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984) (the cse that ultimately pro-
hibited the administration of IQ tests to black students in California).
197 See, e.g., Begley, Closing the Gender Gap, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 11, 1988, at 73 (noting
the continued disparity in scores between men and women on mathematics tests). See
also N. MEDINA & D. NEILL, supra note 179, at 8 ("Gender bias affects both males and
females. Among very young children, some tests appear to be biased against boys. On
the other hand, among older children and adolescents, most bias affects girls.").
198 See P. ROSSER, THE S.A.T. GENDER GAP: IDENTIFYING THE CAUSES (1989) (avail-
able from the Center for Women Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.).
In a ruling that could have a significant effect on public policy in the area of testing,
a New York federal district court recently determined that the SAT did indeed discrimi-
nate on the basis of gender. In light of this determination, the court held that the prac-
tice of relying solely on SAT scores to determine the winners of Regents and Empire
Scholarships violated both Title IX (20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)) and the Equal Protection
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research suggests that socioeconomic status impacts directly on a
student's ability to succeed,19 9 lending support to the argument that
testing may discriminate on the basis of wealth.200 Finally, a signifi-
cant body of research has identified previously unexplored aspects
of culture and personality. 20 1 Studies concerning human nature and
the impact of the environment on the learning process may lead, for
example, to the identification of a discrete class of students who sim-
ply do not perform well on multiple-choice tests and who are "not
accountable for this disabling status. 20 2
3. The Consequences of Deprivation: Effects on Individuals and
Society
The Plyler framework requires consideration of both the effects
Clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Sharif v. New York
State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
"After a careful review of the evidence," Judge Walker declared, "this Court con-
cludes that SAT scores capture a student's academic achievement no more than a stu-
dent's yearbook photograph captures the full range of her experiences in high
school.... The evidence is clear that females score significantly below males on the
SAT while they perform equally or slightly better than males in high school. Therefore,
the [State Education Department's] use of the SAT as the sole criterion for awarding...
[s]cholarships discriminates against females .... Id. at 362, 364.
199 See, e.g., Gaps in Admission-Test Scores Linked to Income, Coursework, Educ. Week, Mar.
9, 1988, at 3, col. 3 ("If we could move [Hispanics] into higher income levels, and get
them to take more academic courses, they would achieve equally well," according to
University of Iowa Professor George A. Chambers, author of a new study on this sub-
ject).
See generally W.J. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1978) (noting the
increasing importance of class and family background for blacks as a factor in determin-
ing who goes to college and overall academic achievement).
200 For a notable example of this argument, see NAIRN, supra note 188, at 197-220
(Chapter 5--"Class in the Guise of Merit"--providing evidence that ETS discriminates
between the rich and the poor).
201 See, e.g., A Special Issue: The Study and Practice of Leadership, 73 LIBERAL EDUC. 2-40
(Mar.-Apr. 1987); Benson, Buckley & Medrick, Families as Educators: Time Use Contribu-
tions to SchoolAchievement, inJ. GUTHRIE, SCHOOL FINANCE POLICY IN THE 1980's: A DEC-
ADE OF CONFLICT (1980); Mann, Siegler & Osmond, Four Types of Personalities and Four
Ways of Perceiving Time, 6 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 76-84 (Dec. 1972). See generally A Special
Issue: Psychological Science and Education, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1025-1182 (Oct. 1986) (a
broad overview of current research and applications).
202 See, e.g., Sternberg, Misunderstanding Meaning, Users Overrely on Scores, Educ. Week,
Sept. 23, 1987, at 22 ("The selection and placement system in education is heavily
weighted in favor of applicants who test well. We often pass up students who may pos-
sess other strong qualifications .... [Typical standardized multiple-choice tests] do not
measure synthetic or insightful-thinking skills, nor do they measure practical intellectual
skills."). For a detailed overview of Professor Sternberg's findings, see R. STERNBERG,
BEYOND IQ: A TRIARCHIC THEORY OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (1985).
See generally Cronbach, Heredity, Environment and Educational Policy, 39 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 339 (1969) ("What the person does with an experience, and what it does to him,
depends on physical structures that were laid down during the previous years, or days,
of his existence."). See also supra note 177.
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on an individual and the costs to society.20 3 The ultimate conse-
quences of deprivation may range from the short-term effects of an
inappropriate educational setting to the lasting, long-term impact of
an inferior self-image and a mediocre education.
Inappropriate classroom assignments based on faulty assess-
ments place significant obstacles in the path of students for whom
"education is often the only route by which to become full partici-
pants in our society." 20 4 Instead of gaining the skills and knowledge
that will enable them to become "self-reliant, '" 20 5 students begin to
lose interest in school. Faced with material that is too easy, too diffi-
cult, or simply irrelevant, young people look elsewhere for excite-
ment and fulfillment. Even if they stay in school, their energies too
often are directed toward such destructive pursuits as drug abuse
and gang-related activities. 20 6
The stigma of failure resulting from such inappropriate place-
ments, or from categorizing and labeling students on the basis of
test scores, does not cease at the time the child leaves school. 20 7
The Plyler Court described the consequences of this stigma-related
deprivation: "[W]e foreclose," the Court explained, "the means by
which [disfavored students] might raise [their] level of esteem." 208
Evidence of a negative impact on students' self-concepts proved
particularly damaging to the state's position in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,20 9 and litigators today can rely on even more sophisticated
social science research.2 10
"Enduring disabilities" 211 such as illiteracy, which can have a
permanent and irreversible effect on future employment opportuni-
ties, are a particularly frightening consequence of deprivation in a
school setting. One highly respected commentator recently noted
that "the sanctions attached to test results have become the most
203 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-24.
204 See Kadnmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2494.
205 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222.
206 Innumerable sources document the often-related problems of drug abuse and
gang activity among young people today. See, e.g., Crack: The Junkies, The Jailers, The
Pimps, and the Tiniest Addicts, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 28, 1988, at 64.
207 See Kirp, supra note 140, at 731-37, for an excellent overview of the stigma issue
and the ways that schools stigmatize students.
208 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222.
209 See 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). The Brown Court relied heavily on psychological
and sociological data to analyze "the effect of segregation ... on public education" and
concluded that the stigma imposed on black children was unacceptable.
210 See, e.g., Raffini, Student Apathy: A Motivational Dilemma, 44 EDUC. LEADERSHIP
Sept. 1986, at 53 ("[n]orm-referenced, competitive evaluation procedures force 50 per-
cent of the student population into the bottom half of the graduating class.... [Miost
students conclude early ... that once below average, always below average.").
211 See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222, referring to illiteracy as an example of an "endur-
ing disability."
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striking aspect of the new surge in testing. The term coined to de-
scribe this is 'high-stakes testing': the financial, educational and
other psychological consequences of passing or failing the test have
become greater than in the past. '2 12 Language from Plyler alluding
to "the inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social, economic,
intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual" 213 is es-
pecially applicable in this context.
These adverse effects on the individual also represent signifi-
cant social costs. Courts should consider these costs in applying the
Plyler framework. 214 All Americans are adversely affected when
young people leave public schools less skilled and less confident due
to failures of the educational system.
Compelling evidence establishing a direct connection between
standardized testing practices and such enduring disabilities may
serve to facilitate the express recognition of an intermediate judicial
review in a school setting. Additionally, litigation in this area might
advance important educational policy goals. Plaintiffs could seek to
foster the use of fairer and more effective evaluation procedures in
the public schools, including the adoption of advanced systems em-
ploying new technology, as well as a testing program that utilizes a
variety of evaluation instruments. Litigants could also seek to pro-
hibit the practice of exclusive reliance on test scores when making
major educational decisions.
B. Adverse Effects of Curriculum Design and Implementation
Curriculum reform has become a major policy issue in the late
1980s. The highly publicized efforts of prominent national lead-
ers,2 15 reinforced by several widely acclaimed best sellers,21 6 have
generated increasing concern in this area.217 Plaintiffs challenging
curricular practices under the fundamental rights framework could
follow the model set forth in Part III-A, focusing either on deficient
212 See Fiske, supra note 170, at 17, col. 1.
213 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222.
214 Id. at 223-24.
215 See, e.g., report by former Secretary of Education William J. Bennett, James
Madison High School: A Curriculum for American Students, reprinted in Educ. Week, Jan. 13,
1988, at 27 (proposing a core curriculum that allegedly reflects the common goals of
most Americans): "I believe that there remains a common ground that virtually all our
schools can reach and inhabit. And I believe that most Americans agree about where
that common ground is-about what our students should learn." Id. at 27, col. 1.
216 See A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987); E. HIRSCH, CUL-
TURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW (1987).
217 See, e.g., Greene, In Search of a Critical Pedagogy, 56 HARV. EDUC. REV. 427 (1986)
(outlining major historical, philosophical, and sociological issues that must be consid-
ered by those who would choose America's pedagogical direction).
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curricular design, or on a failure to implement a strong and effective
curriculum.
1. The Flawed Curriculum as an Unreasonable Obstacle to
Advancement
Plaintiffs could demonstrate a denial of equal opportunity by a
showing that an inappropriate and ineffective curriculum does not
meet the student's needs and therefore presents an unreasonable
obstacle to advancement based on individual merit.218 There is
growing evidence of a widespread and ongoing failure on the part of
the schools in this regard.2 19 Litigants focusing on curricular de-
sign 220 could bolster their claims by citing typical state statutes re-
quiring that a curriculum meet "the educational needs of students
and the public." 22' In Rethinking Curriculum: A Call for Fundamental
Reform, released in late 1988 by the National Association of State
Boards of Education (NASBE), a national panel of state-board mem-
bers charged that weaknesses in curriculum and instruction consti-
tute "the fatal flaw in the American education system. ' 222 The panel
has recommended, among other things, "a major and broad-reach-
ing overhaul of course content. ' 223
Occasionally, a curriculum is particularly strong and appropri-
ate on paper, but has not been implemented effectively at the local
level. One reason for this deficiency is the increasingly prevalent
practice of allowing a test to "drive the curriculum." 224 Experts in
this field noted ten years ago that "tests can very easily come to de-
termine skills taught, rather than having desired skills guide the se-
lection of appropriate assessment techniques." 225  Educators,
increasingly seeking to increase their pupils' test scores, may skew
their teachings towards those areas covered by the standardized
tests. Such practices deny students the opportunity to develop their
writing skills, 226 and deprive young people of valuable learning in
218 See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
219 See, e.g., Magnet, Special Report: How to Smarten Up the Schools, FORTUNE, Feb. 1,
1988, at 86 ("The failure of U.S. public education from kindergarten through high
school is vast and ominous.").
220 Litigants may wish to focus on state frameworks, or on the curriculum as inter-
preted at the local district level.
221 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 229.555(1)(b) (West Supp. 1988). See supra notes 48-50 and
accompanying text.
222 Rothman, Carnegie "Units" Should Go, Says Study by Boards, Educ. Week, Nov. 2,
1988, at 1, col. 4 (quoting NASBE report).
223 Id
224 The NASBE report explicitly notes that "tests drive the curriculum." Id. at 18,
col. 4 (quoting NASBE report).
225 Haney & Madaus, Making Sense of the Competency Testing Movement, 48 HARv. EDUC.
REV. 462, 471 (1978).
226 See, e.g., D. OWEN, supra note 166, at 264. After posing as a senior in a public
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the areas of analysis, synthesis and evaluation. 227
2. Proposed Changes in Curricular Policy
The adoption of a core curriculum would provide one reason-
able alternative in the area of curriculum design.228 Former Secre-
tary of Education William Bennett has argued in favor of such a
standardized curriculum, where all Americans would be exposed to
a "core" of basic skills and knowledge. 229 The recent notable ef-
forts of educators representing a wide variety of perspectives sug-
gest a trend toward a common ground in this regard.230 Brighter
high school, the author documented the following experience: "In English class, we
spent six weeks reading a 55-page book, and devoted the rest of our time to memorizing
lists of vocabulary words and solving SAT-like multiple-choice word problems .... We
almost never had to write anything and, aside from our weekly ten-page assignments, we
didn't have to read. In large measure, our time was spent doing multiple-choice
busywork." Id.
227 See, e.g., Barzun, supra note 173, at cols. 2, 3 (outlining the direct connection
between an emphasis on multiple-choice testing and an increasingly deficient
curriculum):
Knowing something means the power to summon up facts and their sig-
nificance in the right relations. Mechanical testing does not foster this
power.... In subjects that require something other than information...
straining toward a plausible choice is not instructional. Nobody ever
learned to write better by filling in blanks with proffered verbs and adjec-
tives.... Multiple-choice tests, whether of fact or skill, break up the unity
of knowledge and isolate the pieces; in them, nothing follows on anything
else, and a student's mind must keep jumping.
See also M. KOURILSKY & L. QUARANTA, supra note 187, at 4-8, for a description of
Bloom's Taxonomy, which conceptualizes student learning by identifying in order of
sophistication a hierarchy of six processes: (1) knowledge, (2) comprehension, (3) appli-
cation, (4) analysis, (5) synthesis, (6) evaluation. An effective curriculum provides op-
portunities for learning in all six areas.
228 The NASBE report has proposed a core curriculum, "in which teachers would
address 'fewer subjects rigorously and in greater depth.'" Rothman, supra note 222, at
18, col. 2 (quoting NABSE report). The curriculum would focus on six broad areas:
language arts, mathematics and science, citizenship, fine arts, health, and foreign lan-
guage. Id. at 1, col. 4.
229 See supra note 215 and accompanying text. The statement issued by the Presi-
dent and the nation's Governors at the recent "Education Summit" appears to be con-
sistent with this position. Not only did America's political leaders agree "to establish a
process for setting national education goals," but they expressly noted the value of "a
rigorous program of instruction [which would] ensure that every child can acquire the
knowledge and skills required in an economy in which our citizens must be able to think
for a living." See "A Jeffersonian Compact": The Statement by the President and Governors, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 1, 1989, § 4, at 22, cols. 2, 5. See also Doyle, Time for America to Set National
Education Norms, L.A. Times, Sept. 9, 1989, § 5, at 3, col. 4 (providing an international
context for this debate).
230 Dr. Marshall S. Smith, Dean of the School of Education at Stanford University,
recently declared that in light of the current activity by national groups, "[iun the next 10
to 15 years we'll be much closer to a national curriculum than we have been in the past."
See Rothman, What to Teach: Reform Turns Finally to the Essential Question, Educ. Week, May
17, 1989, at 8, col. 1. See also A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the Twenty-first Century, The
Report of the Task Force on Teaching as a Profession (the widely acclaimed "Carnegie Re-
port"), at 20:
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students would not be limited by such a mandate, because schools
would provide them with opportunities to advance far beyond "the
basics." Recognizing that absolute equality is impossible,231 the
schools would still be able to guarantee a minimum level of equal
access to basic skills and a dearly defined knowledge base. This
guarantee would be consistent with the minimal standard of educa-
tional adequacy adopted by justice Rehnquist in Board of Education v.
Rowley 2 32 and alluded to by Justice O'Connor in Kadrmas.233
In the area of implementation, the drift toward a test-driven
curriculum and the resulting failure to implement potentially benefi-
cial programs can be halted by policy changes in the area of testing.
Since standardized test scores have become for many the only basis
for comparing and evaluating the success or failure of a school, 2 34
administrators and teachers are under tremendous pressure to gear
their learning programs toward the improvement of multiple-choice
testing skills.2 35 This pressure is exacerbated by expectations on the
part of many parents that the schools "prepare" their sons and
daughters for success on the SAT,236 and by a movement in state
legislatures to establish a link between public school financing and
standardized test scores. In fact, Connecticut has recently become
The skills needed now are not routine. Our economy will be increasingly
dependent on people who have a good intuitive grasp of the ways in
which all kinds of physical and social systems work. They must possess a
feeling for mathematical concepts and the ways in which they can be ap-
plied to difficult problems; an ability to see patterns of meaning where
others see only confusion; a cultivated creativity that leads them to new
problems, new products and new services... ; and, in many cases, the
ability to work with other people in complex organizational environments
where work groups must decide for themselves how to get the job done.
See generally Greene, supra note 217, at 440-41 ("[A] plurality of American voices must be
attended to .... a plurality of life stories must be heeded, if a meaningful power is to
spring up through a new 'binding and promising, combining and covenanting.' ").
231 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198-99 (1982), in which Justice
Rehnquist wrote: "The educational opportunities provided by our public school sys-
tems undoubtedly differ from student to student, depending on a myriad of factors that
might affect a particular student's ability to assimilate information presented in the class-
room." See also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
232 458 U.S. at 198-201.
233 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1988). See generally supra notes 61-63 and accompanying
text.
234 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
235 See McGraw & Wood, Pressure for High Scores Blamed in Test Cheating, L.A. Times,
Sept. 18, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (analyzing recently discovered cheating on standardized
tests by Los Angeles Unified School District personnel).
236 See D. OWEN, supra note 166. In a recent controversy, New Jersey's education
department invited each district to submit its students' scores on the SAT "as part of the
state's three-year-old program." Schools Withhold Data From New Jersey Chief, Educ. Week,
May 11, 1988, at 9, col. 2. A number of superintendents withheld this data, declaring
that they feared the statistics would be used against them in district "report cards." Id.
at col. 1.
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the first state to use test scores as a basis for distributing aid to
school districts. 23 7 Such counterproductive measures can be ame-
liorated by the adoption of new, varied programs of evaluation, and
by the implementation of policies that would forbid decisions based
on one multiple-choice test score alone.23 8
3. The Disabling Status: Unequal Treatment for Those Judged Less
Able
Professor John McNeil has pointed out that "despite recent
political and legal actions intended to assure equal educational op-
portunities, it is clear that ... the able and talented students are
given one curriculum and those students who are judged less able
are given a different one." 239 Thus, the analysis regarding disabling
classifications in the area of testing is equally applicable in the cur-
riculum context.2 40 Groups of students "judged less able" and yet
"not accountable for their disabling status" often fall into certain
identifiable classifications. Litigants choosing to focus on a curricu-
lum which does not meet the needs of all students could identify an
implicated class that has been denied "equal access" to a basic cUr-
riculum. 24 1 Such litigants could argue that the adoption of a core
237 Connecticut to Link Aid, Test Scores, Educ. Week, May 25, 1988, at 10, col. 1.
238 See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 222, at 18, col. 5 (documenting the NASBE report's
recommendations that "[s]chools ... should move to performance-based assessments
and tests that develop students' creativity and thinking skills .... rather than multiple-
choice tests that measure basic skills and factual information").
239 See J. McNEIL, CURRICULUM: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 293 (3d. ed.
1985).
240 See supra notes 191-202 and accompanying text.
241 Legal disputes in the area of"equal access to the curriculum" have typically cen-
tered on the constitutionality of "tracking" and "ability grouping." See Note, Teaching
Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1318 (1989); see generally
J. OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: How SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALITY (1985) (examining the
effects of tracking programs, which classify students based upon their learning ability or
desired future occupation). However, school tracking programs are not necessarily the
only possible focus for plaintiffs alleging a denial of equal access to the curriculum.
Many students arguably have been deprived of "access to information and ideas," irre-
spective of any tracking or ability grouping. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
866 (1982) ("Our precedents have focused [on] . . . affording.., access to discussion,
debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas. And we have recognized that
'the State may not.., contract the spectrum of available knowledge.' ") (citation omit-
ted).
This first amendment interest in receiving information and ideas should qualify as
"an important interest" for purposes of fundamental rights analysis, therefore helping
to trigger heightened scrutiny under a fourteenth amendment equal protection theory
when equal access has been deprived. The interplay between the first and fourteenth
amendments has already been noted in several education-related decisions. See, e.g., Ply-
ler, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (citing first amendment cases in support of a framework that
would trigger an intermediate level of review under the fourteenth amendment). See also
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 113-14 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (documenting first amendment deprivations in his argument that at least a height-
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curriculum of basic knowledge and skills would help ensure that all
students, no matter how they may be tracked or grouped,242 would
be provided with a minimal level of educational adequacy.
Plaintiffs challenging the test-driven curriculum could compile
evidence that the most typical victims of test-driven curriculum
practices fall into identifiable groups of students who consistently
perform poorly on standardized tests and who may not be responsi-
ble for this disabling status. These students tend to be placed in
classes where attempted remediation is geared directly toward the
improvement of "multiple-choice" skills, while others who score
well on such tests are often assigned to classes where they can focus
on the development of more sophisticated skills. 243 So-called reme-
dial students having greater difficulty improving their test scores
may thus find themselves under the greatest amount of pressure to
do so. Ultimately, they may become locked in a pattern of test-
driven instruction that perpetuates failure, when exposure to a more
relevant and wide-ranging curriculum might have enabled them to
develop their talents and leave school with skills that multiple-
choice tests never measure. 244
4. The Consequences of Deprivation: Significant Social Costs
The Plyler Court warned that "[w]e cannot ignore the significant
social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the
means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order
rests. ' 245 Although America's schools are not solely to blame for
this denial, certain curricular practices play a key role in the flawed
process. Echoing the feelings of many educators and policy makers,
Xerox Corporation Chairman David T. Kearns declared recently
ened judicial review, if not strict scrutiny, would be appropriate in this case under the
Equal Protection Clause).
242 See generally Drowatzky, supra note 181, at 44: "Ability grouping or tracking prac-
tices were developed to place children into groups having similar educational needs....
[Tihe practices used can vary considerably from school to school." Id. Drowatzky states
that placing students into tracks is one option among many when creating student
groupings. Id. at 47.
Although tracking and ability grouping are not necessarily synonomous, the word
"tracking" has been used to denote a variety of school "ability grouping" practices. See
id. at 50-56.
243 See generally J. McNEIL, supra note 239, at 217-18, 225-26 (describing the techni-
cal hazards of standardized testing and the possibility of erroneous conclusions drawn
from them).
244 See Ramsey, Unforeseen Consequences: How Reform Perpetuates Social Tracking, 2 UCLA
J. EDuc. 115 (1987). See also Cal. Educ. Code § 51004 (West 1989) (policies regarding
skills that every student who graduates from a public high school should attain). See
generally supra notes 228, 231 (describing the adverse effects of multiple-choice testing on
cohesive thought and the need for development of intuitive reasoning skills in the 21st
century).
245 Plyler, 457 U.S. 202, 221.
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that "if we do not restructure our schools, this nation will be out of
business by the year 2000."246
Kearns argues that "we cannot have a world-class economy with
dropout rates that average 25 percent [and] approach.50 percent in
our cities." 247 Jonathan Kozol, focusing on the "enduring disabil-
ity" of illiteracy, recently noted that "over one third of the adult
population is unable to read editorial opinions [and] millions cannot
understand the warning on a pack of cigarettes or comprehend the
documents they sign to rent a home, . . . buy a car, [or] purchase
health insurance." 248  Rand Corporation's Linda Darling-Ham-
mond, Director of Education and Human Resources, warns that
"[w]e don't have any choice now but to make education effective for
all kids.... We can't afford the inequities [and] the inefficiencies we
have tolerated in the system."'249
Instead of allowing teachers and school-based administrators to
use their intimate knowledge of the learning process and the stu-
dents to help develop the most appropriate solutions for these ineq-
uities and disabilities, 250 school districts and states pressure
educators to improve standardized test scores. 25 1 With job promo-
tions and staffing decisions linked increasingly to higher student
scores, "teachers [become] more concerned with helping students
pass [these tests] than with seeing them learn." 2 52
An additional consequence of test-driven curricular practices is
that "control over curriculums has been shifted ... to testing com-
panies." 253 The Boston Globe recently warned that "hundreds of
companies have sprung up during the past five years . . . sens[ing]
the opportunity for profit in designing and marketing tests for indi-
vidual states and school systems that suddenly have been mandated
by law to test their students." 254 Policy goals underlying litigation
in the area of curriculum should thus include the establishment of
state or federal control over the completely unregulated testing
246 Olson, The "Restructuring" Puzzle: Ideas for Revamping "Egg-Crate" Schools Abound,
But to What Ends?, Educ. Week, Nov. 2, 1988, at 7, col. 1.
247 Id.
248 See Kozol, Literacy and Political Power, L.A. Times, Sept. 11, 1988, § A, at 4-A, col.
I.
249 See Olson, supra note 246, at 7, col. 2.
250 The advantages of "teacher empowerment" have become increasingly more ap-
parent in recent years. See, e.g., Duckworth, Teaching as Research, 56 HARV. EDUC. REV.
481 (1986); McDonald, Raising the Teacher's Voice and the Ironic Role of Theory, 56 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 355 (1986).
251 See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
252 Deutsch, A Mania for Testing Spells Money, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1988, § 3, at 4, col.
2.
253 The Testing Explosion, supra note 174, at 94, col. 2.
254 Id.
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industry. 255
The models outlined in this part set forth a framework for
awarding declaratory and injunctive relief to current public school
students. Other plaintiffs who might arguably succeed under this
approach include students who have graduated with deficient
skills, 256 and "third-party" plaintiffs such as teachers, administra-
tors, and school districts who can demonstrate a nexus between
their own interests and those of the injured students. 257 Any of
these potential lawsuits could provide the Court with a vehicle for
the express recognition of heightened judicial review in an educa-
tion context.
Even if a particular fact situation triggers heightened scrutiny,
the plaintiff will not automatically emerge victorious. It may be that
the interests of a state in a given case outweigh those of a particular
plaintiff seeking relief for the deprivation of education caused by a
denial of equal opportunity. Too often, even after experts have
identified urgent policy imperatives, school districts have hesitated,
equivocated, and ultimately accomplished only marginal reforms.
Yet the alternatives sought by a plaintiff in the area of testing or
curriculum may still be in the earliest stages of development, and
255 American Federation of Teachers President Albert Shanker has outlined some
suggestions in this regard. See Shanker, Testing Needs Regulation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23,
1988, § 2. at 7, col. 5.
256 Parents and students thus far have been unsuccessful in their attempts to win
monetary awards from the schools under a tort theory of "educational malpractice." See
generally Loscalzo, Liability for Malpractice in Education, 14J.L. & EDUC. 595 (1985). Judges
prefer to avoid assessing "the validity of broad educational policies," and are unwilling
"to sit in review of the day-to-day implementation of these policies." Donohue v.
Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 444-45, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418
N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979). Furthermore, the courts have been unable to agree upon "a
workable [standard] of care against which [a school district's] conduct may be mea-
sured." See Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 484, 439 A.2d 582, 584 (1982). See
also Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 826, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 862 (1976) ("the failure of educational achievement may not be characterized
as an 'injury' within the meaning of tort law").
Under state or federal constitutional law theories, however, plaintiffs seeking de-
claratory and injunctive relief have had much greater success. Many courts have re-
viewed curricular policy decisions and have invalidated certain mandates, prerequisites,
and practices. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (first amendment
limits school board's discretion over removing books from school libraries); Lau v. Nich-
ols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (school system must provide English instruction for students of
Chinese ancestry); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (law forbidding teaching of
foreign languages in the younger grades held unconstitutional).
257 See generally Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 297-304
(1984) (asserting that much constitutional third party standing law ought to be under-
stood in first party terms, in that the litigant simply asserts his own right to be regulated
in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule); Sedler, The Assertion of ConstitutionalJus
Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1308 (1982) (arguing that an individual
should be able to prevail in constitutional litigation only if he can show some violation of
his own rights, and that the Supreme Court in fact has acted consistently with this rule).
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the schools may not be able to move directly into the implementa-
tion process. On a case-by-case basis, intermediate review under a
fundamental rights framework can be employed to provide a precise
and equitable adjudication of current disputes.
CONCLUSION
With its decision in Kadrmas, the Court has remained in a pro-
verbial holding pattern, breaking no new ground in the ongoing
controversy over the parameters of the right to equal educational
opportunity, but not foreclosing future applications of Plyler v. Doe.
The rights of families living in poverty remained in limbo, as the
Court sent the same message it had set forth fifteen years earlier in
Rodriguez.
Although most commentators agree that the schools are not the
only parties responsible for the widespread failures of the current
system, school districts and states have simply not earned the sort of
deference some justices would invoke in the area of educational pol-
icy. The legal system has in fact proven to be an effective vehicle for
change in a school setting, and a growing number of decisions ex-
press at least a tacit recognition of this reality.
As this Article has demonstrated, the Court is not as con-
strained in its ability to fashion remedies for disadvantaged students
as Justice O'Connor suggests in Kadrmas. Read together with a
growing number of covertly heightened scrutiny decisions, the Plyler
"fundamental rights" framework emerges as a viable, principled ap-
proach. Whether an intermediate level of review is triggered in this
context depends on an analysis of three factors: (1) the denial of
equal opportunity, (2) the disabling nature of the classification, and
(3) the consequences of deprivation.
Prospective litigation would enable the Court to clarify the ap-
plicability of this framework and expressly recognize heightened ju-
dicial review for education. Unlike Kadrmas, where the student was
not deprived of any education, plaintiffs must demonstrate an actual
deprivation caused by denial of equal opportunity. The related ar-
eas of testing and curriculum are particularly appropriate in this re-
gard, since so many public school students are harmed by
substandard testing programs and flawed curricular practices.
Policy goals should be a key component of any principled litiga-
tion employing fundamental rights analysis. Plaintiffs could point
toward the use of fairer and more effective evaluation procedures in
the public schools, including an end to the practice of relying exclu-
sively on multiple-choice test scores when making major educational
decisions. Litigants might also argue for the development and im-
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plementation of a new curriculum that would seek to provide all stu-
dents with a core of basic knowledge and skills.
Given the complexity and unpredictability of life chances,
schools cannot and should not be expected to be guarantors of suc-
cess. Neither, however, should they be entitled to continue untena-
ble programs that result in unprecedented failure for such a large
percentage of students. A Supreme Court opinion sets a tone, cre-
ates a mood, and defines the parameters of an issue in the same
fashion as a president's major policy decision. One such ruling, ex-
pressly acknowledging the existence of heightened scrutiny in an
education context, may very well serve to foster the kind of profes-
sional accountability that Americans are demanding from their pub-
lic schools.
